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I. INTRODUCTION
“The angel of death has been abroad throughout the land. You may
almost hear the beating of his wings.”1 John Bright’s 1855 speech to the
British House of Commons in which he passionately called for an end to
the Crimean War 2 echoes an enduring sentiment in times of emergency, one
of inevitability and vulnerability—feelings inherent in crisis. Thus, the
essence of emergency—uncertainty, incalculability, and necessity3—is
difficult to prepare for and impossible to predict.
Historically, courts have struggled to maintain the federalist structure in
times of crisis,4 and understandably so. Both the preservation of the Union
and protection of Americans who comprise the Union—including their
most basic rights—are principles the United States was founded on.5 The
conflict between these interests is evidenced by courts’ indecisiveness when
faced with questions regarding emergency powers. Decisions adjudicating
emergency power, whether belonging to the states or the federal
government, highlight the catch-22 innate in the separation of powers.6 On
one end of the spectrum, the government offers individuals utmost freedom
from authoritarianism with very little humanitarian aid or protection from
1. See Arthur L. Goodhart, Lincoln and the Law, 50 A.B.A. J. 433, 434 n.5 (1964) (quoting
SELECTED SPEECHES OF THE RIGHT HON. JOHN BRIGHT, M.P., ON PUBLIC QUESTIONS WITH AN
INTRODUCTION BY JOSEPH STURGE 155 (Ernest Rhys ed., London, J.M. Dent & Co. 1907))
(transcribing Judge John Bright’s speech given, on February 23, 1855, to the House of Commons in
opposition to the Crimean War)).
2. Goodhart, supra note 1.
3. See John Fabian Witt, A Lost Theory of American Emergency Constitutionalism, 36 LAW & HIST.
REV. 551, 553 (2018) (reciting the Lieber view that emergency power turns on “the principle of
necessity”).
4. See discussion infra Section III (discussing the development of the federalist structure and
examples of times of crisis).
5. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“[I]n Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity . . . .”).
6. See discussion infra Sections II, III (balancing the Americans’ interests against the
government’s interests).
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domestic or foreign threat;7 while alternatively, the government may
exercise an indefinite scope of power, but offers individuals swift action and
protection.8 Are our choices confined by polarity? Does a “maybe” option
exist?9
Emergency powers certainly exist,10 despite courts’ disjunct and
incomplete reasoning as to their scope and purpose. Since the inception of
modern constitutional law, courts were asked to decide what powers are
granted to the federal and state governments in times of crisis and what
circumstances lead to designation of a crisis.11 The courts have shown us
the answer to this question is inconsistent at best and highly politicized at
worst. In 1934, Justice Hughes wrote: “While emergency does not create
power, emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power.”12
Just one decade later, Justice Black contradicted the 1934 Court in his
interpretation: “Compulsory exclusion . . . [,] except under circumstances of
direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with [the Constitution]. But when
under conditions of modern warfare . . . [,] the power to protect must be
commensurate with the threatened danger.”13 Justice Hughes denied the
conjuring of new, or extrapolating of existing powers, while Justice Black
indicated emergency powers exist to an unknown extent “under
circumstances of direst emergency and peril . . . .”14
These diverging opinions of the validity of emergency powers imbedded
in American government demonstrate the confusion associated with crises
powers. Legal scholars have likewise produced a variety of proposed

7. See discussion infra Section III.B (discussing a perceived imbalance between the people and
their rulers).
8. See discussion infra Section III.G (describing a president’s exercise of power during
extraordinary times in the Cold War era).
9. See Wayne McCormack, Emergency Powers & Terrorism, 185 MIL. L. REV. 69, 73, 141 (2005)
(“[C]anvass[ing] the options available for a general answer to the question of emergency powers,
considering answers of ‘Yes,’ ‘No,’ and ‘Maybe.’”).
10. See discussion infra Section III (clarifying emergency power during times of war, disease,
terrorist attacks, and pandemics).
11. See Witt, supra note 3, at 551 (beginning an analysis of emergency power in the United States
with those powers allowed to the government after the close of the Civil War and the inception of
reconstruction).
12. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934).
13. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219–20 (approving discriminatory action
under martial law in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack), overruled by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct.
2392, 2423 (2018).
14. Id. at 220 (emphasis added).
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solutions to the emergency powers problem.15 Other scholars would reject
the doctrine entirely, as their belief directs that its potential for misuse
outweighs any utility.16
Both state and federal governments have benefitted from the use of
emergency powers in times of war,17 economic downturn,18 natural
disaster,19 and most recently, pandemic.20 The benefits of governmental
aid were realized despite later criticism that such an exercise was
unnecessary, exaggerated, or worse, unconstitutional.21 Additionally,
emergency powers have been instituted at differing intervals throughout the
course of an emergency. While some legislation is anticipatory in nature,22
other legislation is entirely reactionary.23

15. See McCormack, supra note 1029, at 141 (exploring Professor Bruce Ackerman’s
“supermajoritarian escalator” suggestions and Professor Oren Gross’s “informed public” proposal).
16. See Ana Jabauri, State of Emergency: A Shortcut to Authoritarianism, 2020 J. CONST. L. 121, 123
(2020) (arguing the government should not be permitted to overstep constitutional bounds under the
disguise of a state of emergency regardless of any perceived necessity); see also McCormack, supra note 9,
at 138 (discussing Professor David Cole’s belief that times of crisis demand heightened protection for
individual liberty and Professor Mark Tushnet’s grievances regarding normalization of emergency
power doctrine).
17. See Witt, supra note 3, at 575 (designating the Civil War as the inception of national debate
over emergency powers and necessity); Dennis O’Rourke, War Powers, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157, 164
(1939).
18. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 416 (1934) (responding to mortgage
moratoriums); John T. Fitzimmons, Constitutionality of Emergency Legislation, 2 KAN. CITY L. REV. 72, 72
(1934) (discussing emergency legislation during the Panic of 1837).
19. See Hope Lewis, Human Rights and Natural Disaster—The Indian Ocean Tsunami, 33 HUM. RTS.
12, 12 (2006) (“But governments . . . are also obligated—legally, politically, and morally—to undertake
recovery efforts . . . .”); Richard Curry, Hurricane Katrina Litigation, 37 ST. B. TEX. ENV’T. L.J. 73, 73
(2006) (discussing potential government accountability for damages caused by a hurricane).
20. See Josh Gerstein, Major Shift at Supreme Court on Covid-19 Orders, POLITICO (Nov. 26, 2020,
2:05 AM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/11/26/supreme-court-religion-covid-barrett440808 [https://perma.cc/PLK7-8DQK] (analyzing the Supreme Court’s rulings on challenges to
COVID-19 restrictions); Memorandum from the Attorney General William Barr on Balancing Public
Safety with the Preservation of Civil Rights to Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights and all
United States Attorneys, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/
file/1271456/download [https://perma.cc/7QXR-Z6HJ] (recognizing COVID-19 restrictions
imposed tremendous burdens on citizens’ daily lives).
21. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (abrogating Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944)).
22. See Food Control Act & the D.C. Rents Act, ch. 80, § 1, 41 Stat. 297 (1919) (enacting
protections for consumers in anticipation of supply shortages).
23. See Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act, 1933 Minn. Laws 514 (enacting a grace period
for mortgagors as a response to economic depression).
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Historically, crisis legislation conferred some power to administrative
agencies to regulate or protect members of society, giving rise to claims of
government overreach.24 Thus, at both the federal and state level,
American government has a well-defined scope, but it is not equipped for
flexibility based on the extremity of the circumstances.
II. A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF ENLIGHTENMENT PHILOSOPHY
First, an understanding of constitutional theory is necessary to better
evaluate the societal struggle between individual autonomy and public
cooperation. American values and goals are deeply rooted in the history of
the American Revolution and the founding of the United States.25 Even
before the American experiment, philosophers in Europe imagined a
government wherein the people govern themselves or otherwise consent to
their government by a sovereign entity.26 Their writings inspired thinkers
for centuries and served as a foundation for modern ideas about
government, civil rights, and cultural psychology.27
A. Thomas Hobbes and the Social Contract
Thomas Hobbes theorized that, in order to avoid a cruel and violent
“state of nature,” a sovereign (ideally an absolute monarch) and its subjects
should agree to a contractual relationship based in reason.28 Further,
Hobbes theorized that such an implicit contract would result from rational

24. See Jabauri, supra note 16 (providing a general structure for checks and balances in times of
emergency).
25. See infra notes 48–49 and accompanying texts (equating our capacity for self-governance
with the American Revolution).
26. Alex Tuckness, Locke’s Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (Nov. 9, 2005),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/ [https://perma.cc/8DNH-XA49] (“Locke is
more interested in describing the occasions when the people take power back from the government to
which they have entrusted it.”); Sharon A. Lloyd & Susanne Sreedhar, Hobbes’s Moral and Political
Philosophy, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (Feb. 12, 2002), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hobbes-moral/
[https://perma.cc/QR76-FFUD] (“Hobbes is famous for his early and elaborate development of what
has come to be known as ‘social contract theory’ . . . .”).
27. See Isaak I. Dore, Deconstructing and Reconstructing Hobbes, 72 LA. L. REV. 815, 849 (2012)
(relating Hobbesian philosophy to modern methods of governing and stating “justice and right begin
only where law exists”).
28. See Lloyd & Sreedhar, supra note 26 (noting Thomas Hobbes advocated for a system of
government with an absolute ruler whose sovereignty is accepted by the people in exchange for
protection from fellow subjects and foreign threats); see also THOMAS HOBBES & TOM GRIFFITH,
LEVIATHAN 244–54 (Wordsworth ed. 2014) (discussing the role and duties of the sovereign to the
public, but noting that when protection ends, so too does the obedience of the people).
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thinking individuals on equal footing with one another in a state of nature
or a time before the existence of government.29 In this contract between
government and man, individuals sacrifice some independent exercise of
free will in exchange for the benefits realized by a centralized government.30
Namely, centralized government may offer protection, order, and reliability.
Over the centuries, however, centralized government has also provided
intangible benefits, such as identity.31
B. John Locke and the Consent of the Governed
While Hobbes maintained a relatively pessimistic view of individuals’
ability to govern themselves without devolution to anarchy, Locke proposed
a more optimistic view.32 First, Locke believed people have an undeniable
ability to govern themselves through the “law of reason.”33 Though
ultimately adopting the social contract theory popularized by Hobbes,
Locke proposed that legitimate governments are distinguished from
illegitimate governments in that legitimate rulers first obtain the explicit
consent of the governed.34 Because legitimate sovereignty requires the
governed to give up some autonomy for the benefit of the collective state,
Locke maintained that governments not founded on such consent may be
permissibly rebelled against.35 In his discussion of the right of rebellion and
its influence on both early and modern ideas about American politics,
Professor David C. Williams expresses the idea succinctly, quoting a
pamphlet promulgated by the free militia: “When elected officials break their oath

29. See Lloyd & Sreedhar, supra note 26 (explaining “social contract theory”).
30. See HOBBES, supra note 28, at 100–01 (“[T]hat a man be willing . . . to lay down this right to
all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men
against himself.”).
31. HOBBES, supra note 28, at 168.
32. See Tuckness, supra note 26 (noting it was John Locke’s belief that an absolute right to selfpreservation should be maintained without regard to form of government).
33. See id. (“[T]he fundamental law of nature is that as much as possible mankind is to be
preserved.”).
34. Id.
35. See David C. Williams, The Constitutional Right to “Conservative” Revolution, 32 HARV. CIV. RTS.CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 413, 429 (1997) (identifying a situation where the governed may justifiably
resist the sovereign); see also Tuckness, supra note 26 (discussing interpretations of “Locke’s concept of
the state of nature”).
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to uphold the Constitution, it is not the patriotic citizen who is in rebellion, but the
governing official . . . .”36
Despite Locke’s insistence that the governed possess an inherent right to
participate in, and ultimately control their government, the doctrine of
prerogative seemingly muddies the waters.37 The doctrine allows an
executive to participate in lawmaking and bestows it with powers, which
may only be exercised in the best interest of the people and with their
implied consent or “ratification.”38 The doctrine, as Locke explains it,
emulates our contemporary ideas of emergency powers, where courts have
validated them: “[P]rerogative can be nothing but the [P]eople’s permitting
their [R]ulers to do several things, of their own free choice, where the [L]aw
was silent, and sometimes too against the direct letter of the law, for the
public good; and their acquiescing in it when so done . . . .”39 Has this idea
permeated American politics? Is there an implied ability for executives to
take action otherwise inconsistent with power reserved to the people or their
representatives if done in the interest of the public good? While some
scholars would suggest “yes,”40 others would offer their passionate
rejection.41 The courts have yet to conclusively decide.
The popularity of enlightenment principles and the philosophy of
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke led the Framers to incorporate principles
of Hobbes’s state of nature and Locke’s social contract in the
Declaration of Independence.42 Jefferson’s claim on behalf of future
Americans in separating from English authority is based on a perceived
imbalance of the relationship between the rights of individual colonists and

36. Williams, supra note 35 (emphasis added) (quoting SKIPP PORTEOUS, FIELD MANUAL OF
FREE MILITIA § 1.1.4 (1994)) http://www.patriotresistance.com/Field-Manual-of-the-FreeMilitia.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DLU-NEBF] (obeying authority).
37. Tuckness, supra note 26.
38. Jeffrey M. Gaba, John Locke and the Meaning of the Takings Clause, 72 MO. L. REV. 525, 546
n.77 (2007).
39. Id. (quoting John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
§ 164 (2010) (ebook)).
40. See McCormack, supra note 9, at 140–41 (discussing Professor Gross’s proposal for popular
ratification).
41. See generally Jabauri, supra note 16 (offering a slippery slope analysis of emergency powers);
see also McCormack, supra note 9, at 136–43 (using “yes,” “no,” and “maybe” in classifying views of
emergency powers).
42. See Bruce N. Morton, John Locke, Robert Bork, Natural Rights and the Interpretation of the
Constitution, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 709, 714 (1992) (pointing to the philosophies that inspired the
principles at play in the constitution).
THE
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the sovereign powers of England.43 Thomas Hobbes concluded, given an
imbalance between the protection of the sovereign and the rights of
individuals, citizens have a right to rebel against a government that does not
protect their interest.44 That right of rebellion is clearly reflected in
Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence: when the scales tipped, depriving
colonists of their inherent liberties, their obligation of obedience to the
English government expired.45
C. Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and the Constitution
The government the Framers subsequently built can be understood as an
effort to create a permanent system of balance or separation of powers
wherein the rights of individuals are concrete and unwavering. The power
given to the government is substantial enough to offer protection, but not
so substantial as to infringe on fundamental rights belonging to the people.
Much of the legal resistance to emergency power can be attributed to our
form of government. Americans sought to balance the liberties inherent in
individuals against a need for protection and wellbeing.46 Accordingly,
Americans limited the ability of the federal government to govern.47 The
ideals on which the United States were founded have dominated American
politics and culture ever since. Famously in October 1964, then future
President Ronald Reagan addressed a Barry Goldwater campaign crowd in
Los Angeles, California.48 He invoked Cold War passions and primal
American instincts, addressing the severity of the approaching election:
[T]his idea that government is beholden to the people, that it has no other
source of power except to sovereign people, is still the newest and the most
unique idea in all the long history of man’s relation to man. This is the issue
of this election. Whether we believe in our capacity for self-government or
whether we abandon the American revolution and confess that a little

43. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, paras. 1–2 (introducing the numerous
grievances of the colonists against the British sovereignty).
44. See Lloyd & Sreedhar, supra note 26 (“[P]olitical obligation ends when protection ceases.”).
45. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2–28 (U.S. 1776) (identifying the King of
Britain’s “history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of
an absolute tyranny over” the thirteen United States of America).
46. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
47. Id.
48. Ronald Reagan, Address on Behalf of Senator Barry Goldwater: “A Time for Choosing,”
THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Oct. 27, 1964), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/276336
[https://perma.cc/L6KN-5TVV].
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intellectual elite in a far-distant capitol can plan our lives for us better than we
can plan them ourselves.49

President Reagan’s expressed sentiments persist in American culture even
today, as many insist on governmental restraint even in times of crisis.50
By virtue of the Constitution, the government vows loyalty in protection
of its citizens,51 but would a necessity to preserve the state of the Union and
protect citizens allow occasional intrusion on civil liberties?
Professor Wayne McCormack neatly summarized the struggle when he
wrote, Americans must decide how much liberty we “are willing to
sacrifice . . . for security.”52 He argues civil liberties, especially in times of
desperation, should not be trusted to the courts to dispense with as they
please.53
The late Eugene Wambaugh diverges in his reasoning.54 He argues the
power to preserve the Union is “incidental” to other governmental powers
when they are not expressly denied by the Constitution.55 Other scholars
echoed these sentiments, maintaining the proposition that the ends justify
the means, at least “in all reasonable cases . . . .”56
This Comment does not seek to answer whether one preference is
superior to another, nor will it suggest a solution to the divide among courts,
scholars, and citizens. Rather, this Comment ambitions to explore the
disposition of both the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Texas Supreme Court in an effort to reconcile and understand their
evolving views and the public policy reasons behind them. Additionally, it
explores the consequences of categorical decision-making and speculates as
to the propriety of our goals in settling the dispute.
While some long for a sense of consistency and predictability from the

49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Attorney General William Barr, supra note 20 (reminding
United States Attorneys “the Constitution is not suspended in times of crisis” and requiring vigilance
“to ensure its protections are preserved” while also protecting public safety).
51. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (denying states certain powers).
52. See McCormack, supra note 9, at 72–73 (analyzing the evolution of the federal government’s
ability to wage war since the 9/11 terror attacks).
53. Id. at 72.
54. Eugene Wambaugh, War Emergency Legislation—A General View, 30 HARV. L. REV. 663, 668
(1917).
55. Id.
56. O’Rourke, supra note 17, at 163.
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courts, I suggest a more realistic goal in the face of unpredictable
catastrophe: sustainability.
III. HISTORICAL USE OF EMERGENCY POWERS IN TEXAS
AND THE SUPREME COURT
A. The Adoption of the Constitution as an Emergency
Prior to the execution of the Constitution, the Articles of Confederation
reserved almost absolute sovereignty to each state and failed to promote a
system of government conducive to widespread cooperation among states,
stifling trade and travel and foregoing widespread protection from foreign
enemies.57 States were offered utmost freedom, which largely meant
fending for themselves. The government had no ability to tax, and
consequently, no ability to spend.58 Disorganization, confusion, and
ensuing chaos led to the need for more centralization, cooperation, and the
federalist structure known today.59 Due to Americans’ distaste for
absolutism, the Framers incorporated extensive checks and balances among
three branches of government, though the Constitution as adopted would
ultimately bestow the federal government with more power than was
previously thought appropriate.60 Additionally, the Framers sought
protection of individuals’ rights as they subsequently enacted and ratified
ten amendments to the Constitution as the Bill of Rights.61 Under this
structure, Americans could be confident in their basic, fundamental
57. See Douglas G. Smith, An Analysis of Two Federal Structures: The Articles of Confederation and the
Constitution, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249, 250, 255 (1997) (“The misfortune under the latter system has
been, that these principles are so feeble and confined as to justify all the charges of inefficiency which
have been urged against it . . . .”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 255 (James Madison) (Edward
Mead Earle ed., 1936)); see also Jeremy M. Miller, It’s Time for a New U.S. Constitution,
17 SW. U.L. REV. 207, 210 (1987) (stating the Articles of Confederation provided individuals more
autonomy).
58. See THE FEDERALIST, at xv (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., J.P. Lippincott &
Co., 1864) (“The Congress issued pledges for money it had no means to pay, called for soldiers it had
no means to support, entered into treaties it could not fulfil . . . .”).
59. See Smith, supra note 57, at 253, 285 (“[A]lthough many of the enumerated powers under
the Articles and the Constitution were identical, the general government enjoyed greater enumerated
powers under the Constitution than it had under the Articles of Confederation.”).
60. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 48 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earl ed., 1937)
(“The regular distribution of power into distinct departments . . . have made their principal progress
towards perfection in modern times.”).
61. See Smith, supra note 57, at 333–35 (discussing the importance of popular sovereignty
among the Framers and their incorporation of it in the Bill of Rights).
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freedoms, including speech and religion,62 unreasonable search,63 and
procedural due process.64
The Framers imagined a society which must answer to the people it
governs, as it is founded on a written social contract between the
government and the governed, the Constitution. The Constitution creates
an apparent inability for governmental overreaching, and a bottom line for
fundamental liberties granted to citizens. Although these principles seem
clear, disagreement over the amount of power afforded the government—
especially in times of emergency—generated controversy not only at the
time of its enactment, but even today.65 While some argue the Constitution
granted a ceiling to governmental power,66 other scholars, politicians, and
judges would argue it created a floor.67
Contrasting optimistic enlightenment principles, which inspired the
Constitution, the 1876 Texas Constitution, as adopted, was tasked with
“shackl[ing]” the government as it recovered from secession and Civil
War.68 Similar to the federal Constitution, separation of powers and the
protection of Texans’ fundamental rights reigned.69 Although Texas’s
1876 Constitution was a visceral reaction to carpetbagging reconstructionera politics, it installed a similar structure to the federal government by
reserving as much power to the people as possible for fear of tyrannical
intrusions on civil liberty.70 Although the constitutional climates between
the Texas and federal constitutions differed, each resulted in a government
with enumerated rights for both the federal government and for the people.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. V–VIII.
65. See Smith, supra note 57, at 331 (rebutting Bruce Ackerman’s contention that ratification of
the Constitution was clearly illegal under the Articles of Confederation). See generally McCormack, supra
note 9 (offering an analysis of differing views of emergency powers).
66. See Jabauri, supra note 16, at 135 (arguing emergency powers are not constitutionally
permissible and should not be used in the interest of preserving the American “legal system”).
67. See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1030 (2004) (proposing
politicians “consider a more hard-headed doctrine . . . that allows short-term emergency measures but
draws the line against permanent restrictions”); see also MICHAEL S. ARIENS, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND HISTORY 16 (2d ed. 2016) (using a ceiling and floor analogy to express
the Supreme Court Justices’ views on constitutional provisions in Marbury v. Madison).
68. Harold H. Bruff, Separation of Powers Under the Texas Constitution, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1337,
1339–40 (1990).
69. See id. at 1341 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 303 (James Madison) (Edward Mead
Earle ed. 1937)).
70. See id. at 1339 (“Texans suffered under a corrupt and autocratic regime that featured a
carpetbag legislature . . . .”).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

11

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 53 [2022], No. 1, Art. 7

298

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:287

The authors of the Texas Constitution expressed their intentions in
Article I, highlighting both the need for a sovereign government and the
need for Texans to exercise individual liberty.71
The political climates inspiring the federal and the Texas Constitution
affected the respective governments’ abilities to react in an emergency,
including those fundamental rights protected from governmental
intrusion.72
B. The Civil War (1861–1865)
Constitutional questions raised over the Civil War mark the inception of
the modern emergency power doctrine.73 A lawyer and spirited advocate
for secession, Lambdin P. Milligan, was arrested facing charges of
conspiracy, inciting insurrection, treason, and other miscellaneous war
crimes.74 President Lincoln’s attempt to suspend the writ of habeas corpus,
and therefore confine Milligan without proving that doing so was lawful,
prompted the Supreme Court to issue a unanimous opinion addressing the
President’s action, taking into consideration its timing in relationship to the
Civil War and public emergency.75 In its opinion, the Court rejects
contentions that the Civil War would validate or excuse usurpation of a
person’s fundamental right to contest the rationale for their imprisonment
while judicial redress to accomplish such opposition was actively available.76
71. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“The faith of the people of Texas stands pledged to the
preservation of a republican form of government, and, subject to this limitation only, they have at all
times the inalienable right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such manner as they may
think expedient.”). The Texas Constitution establishes a firm position of belief in a citizen as an
individual and purports to protect those inherent rights of individual citizens.
72. Notably, the Texas Constitution apportions more fundamental liberties in its Bill of Rights
than does the federal Constitution. Compare TEX. CONST. art. I §§ 1–34 (listing thirty-two “great and
essential principles of liberty and free government”) with U.S. CONST. amends. I–VIII, XIII–XV, XIX,
XXVI (listing thirteen enumerated constitutional rights of the people). Texas promises to protect not
only those rights recited in the federal Bill of Rights, but rights such as hunting and fishing, rights of
the “unsound mind,” bankrupt persons, liens against homesteads, and more. TEX. CONST. art. I. § 34
(granting hunting & fishing rights); TEX. CONST. art I, § 15-a (governing people of unsound mind);
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (providing a homestead protection for property owners).
73. See generally Witt, supra note 3 (recounting the history of emergency powers in the
United States and its legal development beginning with the American Civil War).
74. Harold H. Burton, Two Significant Decisions: Ex parte Milligan and Ex parte McCardle,
41 A.B.A. J. 121, 121 (1955).
75. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 118−21 (1866); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it.”).
76. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121.
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Justice Davis notes the Constitution does not yield to emergency and active
court systems insist on its protection of liberty.77 Notably, the Court first
recognizes the decision implicated a balance of sovereignty against inherent
individual rights; a conflict that, Justice Davis writes, was clearly anticipated
by the Founders in the drafting of the Constitution.78 Despite powerful
language, which appears to slam a door in the face of emergency powers,
the Court reserves the possibility that a crisis requiring the government to
assume more power and overcome individual liberties may eventually
occur.79 Justice Davis recites the first guidelines for such an instance and
notes that the invasion, depriving persons of constitutionally-granted rights,
must be “actual and present[,]” and must “effectually close[] the courts and
Justice Davis avoids further
depose[] the civil administration.”80
elaboration of circumstances causing an “effective” closure of the judicial
system.81
Texas’s secession from the Union required the Texas Supreme Court to
later adjudicate the validity of laws created under the Confederate States. In
Jones v. McMahan,82 the Texas Supreme Court responded to a challenge of a
stay law enacted in 1866.83 In its unanimous rejection of the law’s
legitimacy, Chief Justice Morrill, writing for the court, first recognizes that
77. Id.; see John P. Frank, Ex Parte Milligan v. The Five Companies: Martial Law in Hawaii,
44 COLUM. L. REV. 639, 639 (1944) (“It is the pledge of the Supreme Court to the people of the
United States that the constitutional right of freedom from arrest and punishment at the caprice of the
executive branch of the Government, particularly the military, and the right of trial by jury can never
be taken away so long as the courts are open and can function.”). Notably, the suspension clause in
Article I, § 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution does allow the Writ of Habeas Corpus to be
suspended in times of “rebellion.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The Court, however, saw the exercise
of this power as constitutionally impermissible due to continued operation of the judicial system.
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 120–21.
78. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 118–19 (“The founders of our government were familiar
with the history of that struggle; and secured in a written constitution every right which the people had
wrested from power during a contest of ages.”).
79. See id. at 120–21 (rejecting President Lincoln’s attempt to suspend the writ of habeas corpus)
(“The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and
covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.”).
80. Id. at 127 (emphasis added) (“If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually
closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law . . . to preserve the safety of
the army and society . . . [the government] is allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can have their
free course.”).
81. Id. (briefly describing “necessity” in broad terms).
82. Jones v. McMahan, 30 Tex. 719 (1868).
83. Id. at 727; see Hans W. Baade, Chapters in the History of the Supreme Court of Texas: Reconstruction
and “Redemption” (1866–1882), 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 17, 63 (2008) (recounting the history of the
Texas Supreme Court leading up to Jones v. McMahan).
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the Texas Constitution, enacted in accordance with the Constitution of the
United States, affords protection from governmental interference with the
obligations of contracts.84 Justice Morrill recounts the defendants’
argument in support of the stay law, quoting defense counsel’s argument for
its constitutionality: “the safety of the people is the supreme law.”85 In
agreeing with this contention, the court says supreme law is found in the
United States and Texas Constitutions; strict compliance with those
Constitutions is the ultimate protector of citizens’ safety.86 Thus the “safety
of the people” and the Constitution are synonymous, not mutually exclusive
as defense counsel suggested.87 The court goes on to limit emergency
powers:
But should the general laws of combustion be suspended because our
dwellings are in flames . . . it might be a real benefit to particular parties
interested at the time, but there is no system of arithmetic by which we could
calculate the injury of even a temporary suspension of these natural laws.88

The court and Justice Morrill, in conformity with the U.S. Supreme Court
just two years earlier, each passionately rejected the existence of emergency
powers and warned of the dangers inherent in them.89
C. Smallpox (1901–1903)
Though the disease had been around for tens of thousands of years, an
outbreak of Smallpox afflicted the northeastern United States in the early
twentieth century.90 Health officials in Massachusetts sought to control the

84. Jones, 30 Tex. at 731.
85. Id. at 735.
86. See id. (“The ‘supreme law’ is the [C]onstitution of the United States and this state, and the
safety of the people consists in the faithful performance of each and all their requirements.”).
87. Id. at 735–36.
88. Id. at 736.
89. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 121 (1866) (arguing an emergency powers doctrine leads to
“anarchy or despotism”); see also Jones, 30 Tex. at 736 (expressing the view that emergency does not
cause temporary cessation in administration of the constitution). Notably, the Texas Supreme Court
in 1868 was comprised entirely of Union-appointed justices; every justice prior to 1866 was replaced
as the Union viewed them as “impediments to Reconstruction . . . .” Court History, TEX. JUD. BRANCH,
https://www.txcourts.gov/supreme/about-the-court/court-history/justices-from-1845–1876/
[https://perma.cc/LQF3-2HSD] (listing of justices from 1845–76). In that sense, the 1868 Texas
Supreme Court was not reflective of the will of Texans.
90. Note, Toward a Twenty-First-Century Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1820,
1822 (2008).
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outbreak by instituting a policy of mandatory vaccinations.91 Refusal to
receive an injection was punished by a five dollar fine.92 Henning Jacobson
refused vaccination, was fined, refused to pay his fine, and criminal charges
were brought against him.93 Jacobson responded to his charges by
challenging the validity of compulsory vaccination.94
Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of a 7–2 Court, which held
mandatory vaccination is within the realm of states’ police powers under the
Constitution.95 Justice Harlan’s opinion completely flips the script on crisis
legislation. Rather than focus on a person’s right to refuse medical
treatment, the Court’s opinion focuses on the community’s “right to protect
itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its
members.”96 The state, he says, has the right to appoint officials
knowledgeable and qualified to make such decisions, and those decisions,
when approved by the legislature, have the force of law.97 The decision
paved the way for widespread authoritative state policy in areas of public
health.98
Sixteen years later, Texas would try its hand at mandatory inoculation
legislation.
In City of New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt,99 the
Texas Supreme Court was asked whether students had a right to attend
public school despite refusal to receive a Smallpox vaccination.100
The Texas Supreme Court and other courts around the nation have
answered analogous questions in the negative.101 Texas may require public
school students to receive vaccines so long as the requirement is

91. Id. at 1822.
92. Id. (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12, 26 (1905)); Ben Horowitz, Comment,
A Shot in the Arm: What a Modern Approach to Jacobson v. Massachusetts Means for Mandatory Vaccinations
During a Public Health Emergency, 60 AM. U.L. REV. 1715, 1719 (2011) (“The statutory penalty for
refusing a vaccination was a five dollar fine.”). In 2021, the fine would be about $150 due to inflation
since 1905. Value of $5 from 1905 to 2021, CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, https://www.officialdata.org
/us/inflation/1905?amount=5 [https://perma.cc/YGG3-6RDF].
93. Note, supra note 90, at 1822.
94. Id.
95. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28.
96. Id. at 27.
97. Id. at 28.
98. Horowitz, supra note 92, at 1717–18.
99. City of New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt, 207 S.W. 303 (1918).
100. Id. at 304.
101. L. Beverly Lake, Freedom to Worship Curiously, 1 U. FLA. L. REV. 203, 221 (1948).
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“reasonable.”102 Justice Greenwood, writing for the court, cites the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Jacobson for the proposition that
mandatory inoculation does not infringe on constitutional guarantees to
individuals.103 The Court quotes Justice Harlan’s decision in Jacobson at
length, including Justice Harlan’s central argument that liberty for all does
not exist where such liberty infringes on others’ ability to maintain health
and security.104 The Court maintains that this ability to regulate is reserved
to the legislature exclusively, not to the courts or the people individually.105
D. World War I (1914–1919)
In 1914, “[d]ifficulties appeared in the way of peace” and in the form of
a global war, unlike any ever seen before.106 Professor Becker calls the war
and its consequences a “laboratory for the twentieth century . . . .”107 It
was. Participating countries recruited, and in many instances compelled,
their citizens and resources to battle.108 The United States did not officially
join the war until early 1917, and in anticipation of food shortages, enacted
the Food Control Act & the D.C. Rents Act (Lever Act) that summer,
preventing price gouging of necessaries.109 Notably, the Act bestowed the
president with increased authority to direct the distribution of rations, citing
the constitutional permission to wage war as Commander-in-Chief.110 The
Act was also temporary, invoking the emergency of the World War as its
justification and included a provision that rendered it ineffective two years

102. Waldschmidt, 207 S.W.3d at 305.
The Texas Supreme Court reprimands the
Court of Appeals for ruling the vaccination requirement was unreasonable, though no outbreak was
threatened in New Braunfels. See id. at 304 (“When the case was tried, on November 16, 1916, there
was one case of smallpox in New Braunfels . . . .”); see also Chester J. Antieau, The Limitation of Religious
Liberty, 18 FORDHAM L. REV. 221, 231 (1949) (stating mandatory vaccination in public schools has
been held constitutional against freedom of religion challenges).
103. Waldschmidt, 207 S.W.3d at 304.
104. Id. at 304–05 (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27(1905)).
105. Id. at 305.
106. Edward Raymond Turner, The Causes of the Great War, 9 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 16, 31, 33
(1915); Annette Becker, The Great War: World War, Total War, 97 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 1029, 1033
(2015).
107. Becker, supra note 106, at 1032.
108. See Becker, supra note 106, at 1029 (describing the massive contributions to World War I,
including those contributions from nonparticipating nations).
109. Russell Fowler, World War I and the Constitution, 54 TENN. BAR J. 25, 25 (2018).
110. Id.; The Food Control Act & the D.C. Rents Act, ch. 80, § 1, 41 Stat. 297, 297–98 (1919).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol53/iss1/7

16

McLaren: Answering the Call

2021]

COMMENT

303

after its enaction.111 Just two years later, in 1921, L. Cohen Grocery
Company challenged the act’s constitutionality.112
Under the Lever Act, L. Cohen Grocery Co. was assessed criminal
charges for selling sugar at an excessive rate.113 The grocer claimed the
Lever Act was unconstitutionally vague, violating principles of due process
and separation of powers; courts were to become lawmakers, deciding
proper prices for rations.114 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court
agreed with the grocer’s contentions.115 Justice White delivered the
opinion of the Court, which emphasized congressional inability to transfer
lawmaking power to the courts in violation of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments.116
Justice Brandeis joined Justice Pitney’s concurrence.117 Though the
justices agreed with the result, Justice Pitney explains, the Lever Act does
not prohibit selling necessaries at excessive prices.118 His interpretation of
the statute is such that price gouging does not fall within the proscribed
conduct of Section four of the Act if the individual is not conspiring with
This
others to engage in charging such unreasonable prices.119
interpretation may be a testament to the Lever Act’s ambiguity and
susceptibility to alternate interpretations.
In 1924, the Texas Supreme Court considered wartime measures in Bell v.
Baker.120 The Court considered the 1918 Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief
Act, a federal statute which tolled the statute of limitations for individuals
serving in the military to prevent prejudice due to their preoccupation in a
time of war.121 The Court was asked whether the Act was constitutional in

111. § 122, 41 Stat. at 304.
112. See United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 86–87 (1921) (claiming the act and
indictment were vague and broad).
113. Jay R. Herman, Case Comment, Constitutional Law—Void-for-Vagueness, 4 SUFFOLK U.L.
REV. 920, 922 (1970).
114. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. at 86–87. This principle is commonly referred to as the
“void-for-vagueness doctrine.” Herman, supra note 113, at 920 (internal quotations omitted).
115. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. at 88.
116. Id. at 88, 92.
117. Id. at 93.
118. Id. at 96 (Pitney, J., concurring).
119. Id.
120. Bell v. Baker, 260 S.W. 158, 159 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1924, holding approved, judgm’t
adopted).
121. Id.; see Howard Cockrill, Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940, 27 A.B.A. J. 23, 23
(1941) (discussing the purpose of the 1918 Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act).
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relation to its control over state courts.122 Justice Chapman affirmed the
Act’s validity under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution
and the federal government’s ability to wage war.123 The Act thus
undoubtedly applied to state courts.124
E. The Great Depression (1929–1940)
In 1934, the Supreme Court was again confronted with a state of
emergency brought on by economic collapse and the ensuing decade of
economic depression.125 The conflict occurred between a Minnesota
statute delaying foreclosure proceedings and the Contracts Clause of the
federal Constitution.126 Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the Court,
passionately rejects the ability of the judiciary to interfere with legislation
despite a recognized emergency because the legislation is temporary and did
not destroy the contracts.127
In the same year, the Court again considered the role of an emergency
when used as an argument preventing enforcement of the Constitution.128
In Nebbia v. New York,129 a state entity was charged with assigning and
enforcing a single, standardized price for milk sales.130 The owner of a local
grocery store, Nebbia, challenged the statute’s constitutionality under the
Due Process Clause.131 In a divided 5–4 decision, allowing enforcement of
the law as an exercise of emergency power, Justice Owen Roberts recounts
the reason and history for enacting the statute.132 The Court also notes in

122. Bell, 260 S.W. at 159.
123. Id. at 159–60; Cockrill, supra note 121, at 24.
124. Bell, 260 S.W. at 160.
125. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 420, 425–27 (1934) (explaining why
emergency does not conjure additional governmental power) (using the Contracts Clause to reject
government action).
126. See id. at 416 (explaining the provision of the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium law, which
allowed the county to use discretion when granting mortgagors more time to make payments and
postpone foreclosure); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (stating governmental interference with the
“Obligation of Contracts” is impermissible under the Constitution); see generally Fitzimmons, supra
note 18 (giving useful background information and offering a philosophical analysis of the opinion).
127. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 446–48.
128. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 515 (1934).
129. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
130. Id. at 515.
131. Id. at 521.
132. Id. at 529−30. But see id. at 542 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (“Concededly the Legislature
cannot decide the question of emergency and regulation, free from judicial review, but this court should
consider only the legitimacy of the conclusions drawn from the facts found.”).
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some instances an emergency allows the exercise of sovereignty, which
promotes the general welfare despite individuals’ property rights.133
Although Justice Roberts concedes the statute would be violative of
constitutional principles as a “general rule,” he opens his argument by
explaining those rights are “[not] absolute,” because if the Union could not
overcome them in times of desperation, the “government [could] not
exist . . . .”134 Justice Roberts thus expresses willingness to trump
individuals’ due process rights as necessary to preserve the Union.135 His
argument is reminiscent of John Fabian Witt’s elaboration on the Lieber
text, preserving the nation “is paramount to all other considerations.”136
In his dissent, Justice McReynolds satirizes the majority’s use of
emergency powers, discussing the injustice it promulgates:
What circumstances give force to an “emergency” statute? In how much of
the state must they obtain? . . . How many farmers must have been
impoverished or threatened violence to create a crisis of sufficient gravity? . . .
When emergency gives potency, its subsidence must disempower; but no test
for its presence or absence has been offered. How is an accused to know
when some new rule of conduct arrived, when it will disappear?137

Justice McReynolds’s opinion highlights the hypocrisy of the Court
during the depression. While the Court condoned standardized milk prices,
protecting large production companies,138 four justices rejected the state’s
attempt to protect financially vulnerable mortgagors from foreclosure
sales.139
Meanwhile, a Texas mortgage moratorium law, enacted in response to the
economic depression of the 1930s, came under constitutional review in the
Texas Supreme Court in 1934.140 In Broussard v. Paggi,141 the court was
133. See id. at 524–25 (“No exercise of the private right can be imagined which will not in some
respect, however slight, affect the public . . . .”).
134. Id. at 523.
135. See id. at 523 (“But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government
cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows . . . .”).
136. Witt, supra note 3, at 553 (internal quotes omitted) (quoting ADJUTANT GEN.’S OFFICE,
GEN. ORDER NO. 100, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
IN THE FIELD art. 5 (1863)).
137. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 548 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 556.
139. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 483 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
140. Broussard v. Paggi, 76 S.W.2d 1041, 1041 (1934).
141. Broussard v. Paggi, 76 S.W.2d 1041 (1934).
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asked to decide whether the moratorium law was unconstitutional under the
Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I Sections 16,
17, and 19 of the Texas Constitution, or the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.142 In synchrony with the Court in Blaisdell,
Chief Justice Cureton rejected the constitutionality of the moratorium law
under the Contracts Clause of the Texas Constitution.143
Although both the Texas Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court
deny mortgagors emergency protection from foreclosure, the U.S. Supreme
Court waivers in its treatment of emergency powers. While it allows
regulation of industry prices for milk producers, it denies mortgagors
forgiveness in times of economic hardship.
F. World War II (1939–1945)
A governmental conflict of interest again stemmed from the aftermath of
the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.144 As racial tensions
mounted against persons of Japanese ancestry, so did overwhelming fear
and nationalism. Subsequently, the U.S. Army issued Exclusion Order
No. 34, which excluded Japanese persons from a militarized area in
California, forcing them to relocate their homes and livelihoods in
accordance with the order.145 Fred Korematsu’s purposeful defiance of the
exclusion order led the Court to consider whether the perceived threat of
Japanese espionage to American national defense would justify
discrimination against individuals on the basis of their Japanese heritage.146
In a 6–3 decision, Justice Black, writing for the Court, deferred to the
military’s judgment.147 Relying heavily on Hirabayashi v. United States,148
Justice Black rationalized the discriminatory order as an instance of the
military’s ability to exercise emergency power: “Nothing short of
142. Id. at 110–11, 76 S.W.2d at 1041.
143. See id. at 111, 76 S.W.2d at 1041 (striking down state intervention in foreclosure sales);
see also Tex. Const. art. I, § 16 (“No . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made.”).
144. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–17 (1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii,
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
145. See id. (reciting the facts and explaining the relevance and purpose Exclusion Order No. 34
serves).
146. Eric L. Muller, Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and the Second Monster, 98 TEX. L. REV. 735, 736
(2020).
147. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215–17 (“[W]e are unable to conclude that it was beyond the war
power of Congress and the Executive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war
area at the time they did.”).
148. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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apprehension by the proper military authorities of the gravest imminent
danger to the public safety can constitutionally justify either.”149 The
“gravest imminent danger,” the Court articulated, was evidence by disloyalty
of some Japanese-Americans coupled with an inability to sort the loyal from
the disloyal.150 Justice Black goes to great lengths to separate the order
from a pure notion of racial prejudice. He rejects terminology such as
“concentration camp,” replacing it with “relocation centers” and noting that
racial discrimination must be viewed in light of the danger to the public.151
The Court ultimately concluded that the extent of the threat was thwarted
by the military when it instituted and enforced these exclusionary orders
based on racial discrimination.152 This conclusion was adopted despite the
Court’s recognition that the classification based on a person’s heritage is
“immediately suspect” and subject to heightened scrutiny.153
Justice Frankfurter, in his concurrence, cites the source of emergency
powers more clearly, indicating that the power and discretion granted to
Congress and the military is no less part of the Constitution than the
“provisions looking to a nation at peace.”154 Justice Frankfurter appears to
strongly reinforce the idea of emergency powers and finds their origin in the
Constitution itself on equal footing with those provisions protecting
individual liberty.
It is worthwhile to note that the decision in Korematsu generated
substantial criticism in dissents by Justice Roberts, Justice Murphy, and
Justice Jackson.155 Though writing separately, the Justices agree that the
decision grossly exceeds any discretion granted to the military by the power
to wage war, violates Korematsu’s constitutional rights, and is rooted in
racism.156 The Korematsu decision was eventually abrogated in 2018 by
149. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216–18 (comparing the order in Korematsu to the curfew order in
Hirabayashi which was also upheld as a constitutional exercise of power); see also Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 104 (1943) (condoning the enforcement of discriminatory orders under the
government’s ability to wage war and protect the public); Muller, supra note 146 (arguing Hirabayashi
left a legacy just as pernicious as Korematsu).
150. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216–18 (reasoning some Japanese-Americans were disloyal and
those that were loyal could not be distinguished).
151. See id. at 223–24 (“[T]he need for action was great, and time was short.”).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 216.
154. Id. at 224 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
155. See, e.g., id. at 225 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority because the
“indisputable facts exhibit a clear violation of Constitutional rights”).
156. In the dissenting opinions, all three justices unequivocally agreed that the military greatly
exceeded their scope of authority, discriminated based on race, and violated the Constitution.
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Trump v. Hawaii.157 Chief Justice John Roberts addresses Korematsu as he
notes that the dissent has put the case at issue by invoking it in its
analysis.158 Chief Justice Roberts vehemently denies compatibility between
the Constitution, the Korematsu case, and the immigration statute at issue in
Trump v. Hawaii.159 Further, Professor Jamal Greene criticizes the decision
based on the prioritization of the protection of national security over
fundamental rights of individuals as being on par with Dred Scott 160 and
Plessy v. Ferguson,161 calling the decision “anticanonical.”162
Meanwhile, in Texas, the second World War led the
Texas Supreme Court to decide whether a district judge’s absence due to
wartime orders in the military was a vacation of his office so as to allow the
temporary judge compensation for serving in his place.163 In so deciding,
the court illuminates its principles of constitutional interpretation in
relationship to times of emergency and times of peace.164 Justice Sharp
writes that the Constitution is a rigid expression of the will of the people;

Their opinions contain a veritable treasure-trove of stinging rebukes. See id. at 226 (Roberts, J.,
dissenting) (“I need hardly labor the conclusion that Constitutional rights have been violated.”);
id. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“Yet no reasonable relation to an ‘immediate, imminent, and
impending’ public danger is evident to support this racial restriction which is one of the most sweeping
and complete deprivations of constitutional rights in the history of this nation in the absence of martial
law.”) (quoting United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. 623, 628 (1871)); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 247 (Jackson,
J., dissenting) (“I should hold that a civil court cannot be made to enforce an order which violates
constitutional limitations even if it is a reasonable exercise of military authority.”).
157. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (expressing an obvious sentiment regarding
Korematsu). The racial discrimination of Korematsu is comparable to some of the United States’
worst intrusions on personal liberty. Jamal Greene, Is Korematsu Good Law?, 128 YALE L.J. F. 629, 632
(2018–2019) (placing Korematsu’s decision “in the company of other notorious cases such as
Dred Scott v. Sandford, Plessy v. Ferguson, and Lochner v. New York”).
158. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423.
159. See id. (“Korematsu has nothing to do with this case. The forcible relocation of U.S. citizens
to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the basis of race, is objectively unlawful and outside
the scope of Presidential authority.”); see also Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216–17 (examining the
constitutionality of the forced relocation of Japanese-Americans).
160. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (enslaved party), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
161. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
162. Greene, supra note 157; see Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 454 (holding Petitioner was not a citizen
because he was of African slave descent); Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551–52 (rejecting the proposition that
“social prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro
except by an enforced” desegregation).
163. Cramer v. Sheppard, 167 S.W.2d 147, 148 (1942).
164. Id. at 154.
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“it is not different at any subsequent time.”165 The court goes further and
appears to reject any circumstances excusing a suspension of the principles
of the Constitution, declaring that the Constitution does not give effect to
“consequences.”166 The decision would mark the beginning of a long line
of Texas cases denying emergency powers to the government.
Chief Justice Alexander dissented, strongly advising the consideration of
extenuating circumstances in decisions necessitating adjudication of
constitutional provisions.167 In his view, the Constitution should be
construed as an evolving document under which the obvious intention of
the people to promote the public interest is of utmost importance.168
G. The Cold War Era (1945–1990)
In 1952, the Court was asked to decide whether President Truman had
the authority to direct the seizure and operation of the nation’s steel mills in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.169 It is essential to note that
President Truman’s executive order was issued in circumstances of an
impending strike and anticipated labor shortage, in the midst of the
Korean conflict.170 The mills largely complied with the orders, but filed a
lawsuit claiming the President’s action was impermissibly legislative in
nature, a duty residing in Congress.171 Justice Black delivered the opinion
of a 6–3 Court, which offered its swift rejection of the order, even as the
government contended that the unavailability of steel would “immediately
jeopardize our national defense . . . .”172 Justice Black first explains the
power the President used in seizing the mills, if constitutional, must have
originated either from the Constitution or a congressional act.173 The
Court finds that Congress took affirmative and inconsistent action in 1947
165. Id. at 285, 167 S.W.2d at 154.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 294, 167 S.W.2d at 159 (Alexander, C.J., dissenting) (“A fundamental canon of
constitutional construction . . . is the rule that a construction of a constitutional provision which leads
to great public inconvenience or to the sacrifice of great public interests, or to unjust discrimination,
or to absurd consequences, will not [be adopted] if the provision is reasonably susceptible of an
interpretation which will avoid such consequences . . . ”).
168. Id.
169. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582–86 (1952) (explaining the
constitutional powers of the President).
170. See id. at 582 (recounting the context for the President directing the Secretary of Commerce
to seize the steel mills).
171. Id. at 583.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 585.
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when it opposed an amendment to the Taft-Harley Act, which would have
created the power President Truman used in this case.174 Likewise,
justification for the President’s action cannot reside in the Constitution.
Neither the constitutional designation of the president as
Commander in Chief, nor the Article II mandate that the president “take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” permit the exercise of such
power.175
Justice Douglas concurs, aptly noting the emergency faced by the nation
in an impending labor crisis at a time when steel is needed to aid national
defense “did not create power . . . .”176 Notably, he recognizes both the
convenience and the duty of the President to act, commenting on the
authority and speed the office is capable of and calling President Truman
the “trustee” of national security.177 Justice Douglas did not stop there.
He writes that the convenience and righteousness of the order is outweighed
by its later potential for abuse should the Court condone his actions.178 To
the Justices, such an expansion of the Constitution is more dangerous than
the threat it purports to thwart.
The dissent views the issue in another light. Chief Justice Vinson,
Justice Reed, and Justice Minton, in a dissenting opinion written by
Chief Justice Vinson, emphasize the danger faced by the public, should steel
production cease.179 The dissent primarily considers the “context” of the
exercise of authority before determining whether the authority is in
existence by way of the federalist structure, statute, or the Constitution.180
Considering such context, the Chief Justice warns that readers “should be
mindful that these are extraordinary times.”181 Ultimately, the Justices
concluded that the context in which President Truman exercised such a
power is the same circumstance that made it constitutional; if the President

174. Id. at 586.
175. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 586–87 (1952) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
176. Id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 633.
179. Id. at 667 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (beginning the dissent by stating the reasons for the
President’s action and the tragedy which would befall the nation were President Truman not to
intervene).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 668.
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is unable to protect the nation at times when it is required, then the
dissenting Justices wonder who will.182
In 1972, the Supreme Court was again conflicted between dire
circumstances and individual liberties when it decided whether the subpoena
of Senator Mike Gravel’s assistant violates Article I of the
United States Constitution, under the Speech or Debate Clause.183 Gravel
v. United States184 resulted from Senator Gravel’s release of sensitive
documents pertaining to U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, otherwise
known as the Pentagon Papers.185 A federal grand jury sought information
in relationship to the release of those documents from Senator Gravel’s
assistant, Leonard Rodberg.186 Senator Gravel subsequently intervened in
the action and filed motions to quash, asserting privilege in accordance with
the Speech or Debate Clause.187 That clause grants congresspeople
protection from restrictions on speech and immunizes them from
prosecution for such speech.188 It reads, “[F]or any Speech or Debate in
either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.”189
Writing for the Court in a 5–4 decision for Gravel, Justice White upheld
protection for congresspeople and their “aides” under the Speech or Debate
clause, assuming the aides are subpoenaed in connection with their duty as
an aide to the congressperson.190 Although President Nixon would “dearly
like to silence a man like Senator Gravel,” the Court held that potential
intimidation of the legislative branch is precisely the rationale behind
inclusion of the Speech or Debate Clause in the Constitution.191 Those
acts leading up to a legislative act, or in this case, procurement of the
Pentagon Papers, should it be found to be an illegal act, would not be
182. Id. at 680.
183. See generally Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 608 (1972) (asserting to require Leonard
S. Rodberg “to appear and testify would violate” Senator Gravel’s constitutional privilege under the
Speech or Debate Clause).
184. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
185. Id. at 609; see also Lawrence R. Velvel, The Supreme Court Tramples Gravel, 61 KY. L.J. 525,
525–26 (1973) (“As part of its war against those who revealed the Pentagon Papers, the government
wanted to have a grand jury investigate Gravel’s conduct.”).
186. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 608–09.
187. Id.
188. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1; see also Matthew R. Walker, Constitutional Law—Narrowing the
Scope of Speech or Debate Clause Immunity, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 377, 377 (1995); Velvel, supra note 185,
at 526.
189. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
190. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 628–29.
191. Velvel, supra note 185, at 528–29.
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protected under the clause, nor would their release for publication.192
Notably, the majority does not invoke N. Y. Times Co. v. United States,193
which was decided just one year earlier and upheld protection for freedom
of the press despite the Nixon administration’s contention that national
security was at risk in publication of the Pentagon Papers.194 Thus, in cases
where national security may be at stake, legislators should be offered utmost
protection unless their actions to procure information should otherwise be
illegal.195 This decision seemingly attempts to strike a balance between
impunity offered to legislators and executive interest in keeping
governmental documents classified.
Justices Stewart, Douglas, and Brennan dissented in response to the
majority’s decision.196 Justice Stewart’s grievance with the majority was
primarily with the portion of the Court’s decision allowing liability against
legislators for the sources of information they procure or receive.197 He
believes the consequences of that decision will be that necessary informants
would be unable or unwilling to continue to provide congresspeople with
information they need in order to accomplish their goals in drafting and
voting on legislation.198
Dissenting, Justice Douglas takes an alternative view.199 He writes that
not only should Senator Gravel’s actions of reading from the top-secret
documents and introducing them into the public record be protected under
the First Amendment, but so too should his and the press’s actions of

192. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 622; see Walker, supra note 188, at 384 (differentiating between political
acts and official acts); Velvel, supra note 185, at 529 (holding “the speech and debate clause is not
intended to protect the legislator” but instead “is intended to protect so-called legislative acts from
intimidation by the Executive”).
193. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
194. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 614 (“The [C]onstitution gives to every man, charged with an offence,
the benefit, of compulsory process, to secure the attendance of his witnesses. I do not know of any
privilege to exempt members of congress from the service, or the obligations, of a subpoena, in such
cases.” (quoting U.S. v. Cooper, 4 U.S. 341, 341 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (Chase, J., sitting on Circuit) (internal
quotations omitted)); N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714.
195. See Gravel, 408 U.S. at 619 (focusing on the procurement of the papers, rather than their
exposure to the public).
196. Id. at 629 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 633 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 648 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
197. Id. at 631 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
198. See id. at 630 (“[T]he acquisition of knowledge through a promise of nondisclosure of its
source will often be a necessary concomitant of effective legislative conduct, if the members of
Congress are properly to perform their constitutional duty.”).
199. Id. at 633 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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publishing the documents in private.200
In relying on the
First Amendment’s protection of speech for his position, he states, “Forcing
the press to become the Government’s coconspirator in maintaining state
secrets is at war with the objectives of the First Amendment.”201
Justice Douglas’s dissent rejects any claim to protect the Executive Branch’s
classified information as fundamental to democracy and federalism,
regardless of the circumstances in which that action was taken.202
The Texas Supreme Court of the Cold War era followed Youngstown suit.
Though the court was not asked to answer questions of constitutional law,
it expanded notions promulgated by the Youngstown decision in deciding
whether a life insurance policy would provide benefits for an accidental
death.203 The dispute boiled down to whether the insured was killed during
a time of war.204 The insured was killed in a plane crash in Alaska on
military orders to travel there “to open bids for the construction of a
United States Army Air Field . . . .”205
In holding for the insured, Justice Smedley writes that a time of war exists
in some circumstances with or without a formal proclamation from
Congress.206 Obviously, a legal declaration of war and a de facto
determination have divergent implications.207 Though Justice Smedley’s
decision does not enlighten readers as to whether the court’s designation of
wartime would apply in cases of constitutional law, his citation to Youngstown
suggests assent with the Supreme Court precedent during World War II.208
H. 9/11 and War on Terror (2001–present)
On September 11, 2001, the United States was the target of a series of
attacks resulting in what the FBI refers to as “the most lethal terrorist attacks
in history . . . .”209 Subsequently, the federal government has implemented
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id. at 640.
See id. at 640–41 (taking a more liberal view of the protections of the First Amendment).
W. Rsrv. Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 261 S.W.2d 554, 555 (1953).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 557.
John Alan Cohan, Legal War: When Does It Exist, and When Does It End,
27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 222 (2004).
208. See id. at 223 (citing Meadows, 261 S.W.2d at 557 for the proposition that a formal
congressional announcement of a state of war is not necessary for judicial determination of war).
209. 9/11 Investigation, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/history/famo
us-cases/911-investigation [https://perma.cc/A3SY-ZNQT].
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countless policies and other measures aimed at preventing another terrorist
attack. Some of those policies have been accused of infringing Americans’
personal liberties. One such example is the criminal trial against
Javaid Iqbal, and Iqbal’s subsequent Bivens action against the
United States.210 Iqbal, a Muslim Pakistani immigrant was arrested and
accused of conspiracy to defraud the United States and fraudulent
identification documents in 2001 following the September 11 (9/11)
attacks.211 Iqbal pled guilty to the charges against him, was convicted,
incarcerated, and eventually deported.212 The New York Times, in its
article “Justices Turn Back Ex-Detainee’s Suit,” referred to him as “among
thousands of Muslim men rounded up after the [September] 11 attacks.”213
The case which made its way to the United States Supreme Court out of
the eastern district of New York, however, was brought subsequent to that
conviction as a Bivens action, alleging federal governmental officials, ranging
from low-level federal officers to former Attorney General John Ashcroft
and former FBI Director Robert Mueller, deprived him of his constitutional
rights.214 Specifically, Iqbal charged the officials with promoting
unconstitutional race-based policies in the law enforcement, which led to
his separation, designation as a person of “high interest,” and torture.215
On certiorari, the Court was asked two questions: (1) whether Iqbal’s claim
that governmental officials condoned or supervised unconstitutional
conduct could be pled as a Bivens claim; and (2) whether the federal officials

210. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
211. Id. at 666. See generally Desiree L. Grace, Supervisory Liability Post-Iqbal: a Misnomer Indeed,
42 SETON HALL L. REV. 317, 320 (2012) (analyzing Iqbal’s implications and attempting to resolve
confusion among the various interpretations of the case).
212. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 668.
213. Adam Liptak, Justices Turn Back Ex-Detainee’s Suit, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/19/us/19scotus.html
[https://perma.cc/HEE8-HBUT];
see Shirin Sinnar, The Lost Story of Iqbal, 105 GEO. L.J. 379, 383 (2017) (citing IRUM SHIEKH, DETAINED
WITHOUT CAUSE: MUSLIMS’ STORIES OF DETENTION AND DEPORTATION IN AMERICA AFTER
9/11, at 19 (2011)); OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE SEPTEMBER 11
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 16–17 (2003)).
214. Grace, supra note 211, at 321.
215. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 668–69 (“[T]he complaint alleges that respondent’s jailors ‘kicked him
in the stomach, punched him in the face, and dragged him across’ his cell . . . subjected him to [invasive]
searches . . . and refused to let him and other Muslims pray . . . .”). Specifically, Iqbal claimed recovery
under the First and Fifth Amendments. Id.; Grace, supra note 211, at 321–22 (citing Ashcroft, 556 U.S.
at 662).
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could be personally and vicariously liable for that conduct.216 The
Supreme Court issued another 5–4 decision in its response.217
First, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, held that high-ranking
officials such as Mueller and Ashcroft could not be held personally liable for
conduct of inferior federal employees.218 The Court’s opinion rejected
Iqbal’s claims on grounds of plausibility.219 It decided that, even where
some of 220 the Plaintiff’s allegations presumed true, his pleadings did not
allege that the officials acted with the “discriminatory purpose,” required to
sustain an action.221
Justice Souter dissented alongside Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer.222 Souter writes that counsel for the federal officials conceded
Bivens liability, were the facts as pleaded presumed true, and thus liability for
subordinates’ actions are not a question the Court was asked; Iqbal is
entitled to reliance on that concession.223 Additionally, the dissent diverges
on its answer to the second question, as it accuses the majority of letting its
skepticism of the veracity of Plaintiff’s allegations get the better of its
decision.224 Instead, it asserts the applicable standard is that of alleging
facts which, when pled and presumed truthful, indicate a “suggesti[on] of
illegal conduct,” a standard it believes Plaintiff satisfied.225
One scholar praised and lamented the Court’s decision, though almost
exclusively for its consequences in civil procedure, rather than its
significance as a post-9/11 civil rights action.226 Some scholars accuse the
Court of taking a misstep in issuing the decision, claiming the Court was
216. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 689 (Souter, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 665.
218. Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 856 (2010) (citing Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 668).
219. Id. at 857.
220. The Court’s opinion designates some allegations against the federal officials as unworthy
of a presumption of truth, due to their status as being merely “conclusory.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 681.
Ashcroft is largely recognized as a decision that transformed civil procedure rather than a landmark case
in emergency power doctrine. Bone, supra note 218, at 858. Justice Kennedy quotes Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, and accuses Iqbal and counsel of reciting elements of a formula rather than properly
pleading his entitlement to relief. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 681 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007).
221. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 676; Bone, supra note 218, at 858.
222. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 687 (Souter, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 691–92.
224. See id. at 696 (“We made it clear, on the contrary, that a court must take the allegations as
true, no matter how skeptical the court may be.”) (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556).
225. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 696 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 564 n.8).
226. Sinnar, supra note 213, at 381–82.
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“denying justice to a Muslim immigrant who unsuccessfully challenged the
violent conditions of his detention, and . . . crafting a new pleading
standard” in the process.227
Further, legal scholars claim the FBI and other federal officers
implemented policies of unconstitutional discrimination and abuse, though
the Court never reached that issue.228 Some go so far as to wonder whether
the decision represents the Court’s coalescing with unconstitutional law
enforcement against Muslim-Americans.229
Meanwhile, Texas faced similar questions of law in the wake of the 2001
terror attacks. In 2009, the Fifth Court of Appeals determined whether
passengers boarding airplanes have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their belongings under the Fourth Amendment.230 The question arose
after drugs were found in James Kjolhede’s suitcase.231 Justice Morris
wrote the court’s opinion, which centered on their recognition that airport
security had evolved since the 9/11 attacks.232 In its analysis, the Court
addresses the “totality” of the circumstances, departing from the approach
used by Justice Kennedy and the Supreme Court just two months prior.233
The Fifth Court of Appeals made its position clear in holding Kjolhede had
no expectation of privacy in his belongings while traveling.234 The court
quotes the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Aukai writing:
“Any subjective belief a person might have that his baggage checked for
transport aboard a passenger aircraft may not be searched ‘makes little sense
in a post-9/11 world.’”235 Are the Justices adjusting expectations of civil
liberty according to demands for safety, or is it true that the courts would
not have extended Fourth Amendment protection to passengers “even

227. Vivek Mittal, Using Iqbal in Iqbal: Exploiting Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians after September 11,
15 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 114, 115 (2009).
228. See id. at 115–17 (documenting how the government used the national emergency to
discriminate against racial minorities).
229. Id. at 116.
230. Kjolhede v. State, 333 S.W.3d 631, 632 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. ref’d).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 633.
233. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 668, 691–92 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting); see Kjolhede,
333 S.W.3d at 633 (“None of the factors is dispositive; instead, we examine the circumstances
surrounding the search in their totality.”) (citing Smith v. State, 176 S.W.3d 907, 913 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2005, pet. ref’d)).
234. Kjolhede, 333 S.W.3d at 634.
235. Id. at 633 (citing United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 2007)).
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before the attacks of September 11 . . .?”236
Although the
Texas Supreme Court has yet to review the issue, the decision reflects Texan
judges’ willingness to alter expectations based on the 9/11 attacks.
I.

COVID-19 Pandemic (2019–present)

From the inception of COVID-19-related emergency orders, former
Attorney General William Barr warned of the potential for infringement on
citizens’ civil liberties.237 In an official memo, the attorney general called
on United States attorneys to monitor statutes and ordinances that conflict
with constitutional provisions and act when necessary.238
In the fall of 2020, at a Constitution Day event, former
Attorney General William Barr again commented on state and local
regulations that compromise provisions of the constitution protecting civil
liberties.239 The attorney general expressed his belief that the COVID-19
pandemic has caused the worst human rights violations in American history
“[o]ther than slavery, which was a different kind of restraint . . . .”240
Understandably, this statement garnered widespread criticism.241
The Supreme Court has taken an inconsistent position, however. In
May 2020, a 5–4 Court rejected an application for injunctive relief over a

236. Kjolhede, 333 S.W.3d at 631 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
Interestingly, United States v. Place came to the opposite conclusion. That case held that a ninety-minute
period of inspection by narcotic canines was an unreasonable and warrantless seizure, in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. See Place, 462 U.S. at 710 (concluding that the Fourth Amendment was
violated by the seizure of luggage); see also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (“The right to travel
is part of the ‘liberty’ of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the
Fifth Amendment.”).
237. See Memorandum from the Attorney General William Barr, supra note 20 (“Now, I am
directing each of our United States Attorneys to also be on the lookout for state and local directives
that could be violating the constitutional rights and civil liberties of individual citizens.”).
238. See Memorandum from the Attorney General William Barr, supra note 20 (commenting
interfering statutes should be addressed as “the Constitution is not suspended” during times of crisis).
239. Carrie Johnson, Barr Criticizes Prosecutors, Makes Incendiary Comments On Slavery And Pandemic,
NPR (Sept. 17, 2020, 4:08 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/17/914103048/barr-criticizesprosecutors-makes-incendiary-comments-on-slavery-and-pandemic [https://perma.cc/SM2D-CCFT]
(recounting the fallout from former Attorney General William Barr’s inflammatory comments
regarding slavery, civil rights, and the competency of officials in the Justice Department).
240. See id. (providing the recording of the former attorney general’s comments).
241. Id. (“[Congressman] Clyburn[] called those comments by Barr among the most ridiculous,
tone-deaf[,] and awful things he’s heard.”); Eric Tucker, Barr under fire over comparison of virus lock-in to
slavery, AP NEWS (Sept. 18, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-michigan-slaveryhillsdale-william-barr-843dcf4c766a1684164e428752939e07 [https://perma.cc/R7Q4-HGFQ].
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California executive order limiting occupancy in religious buildings.242
What we know of the majority’s decision is limited to the concurrence of
Chief Justice John Roberts. Chief Justice Roberts expresses his view that
although the order distinguishes between religious gatherings and nonreligious gatherings, this particular order is a reasonable restriction in
response to a clear threat to human life, so they should defer to the broad
police power of the states.243 He further explains a request for an
injunction requires an indisputable justification, and because the Court
found the order was a justifiable use of police power, it declined to invalidate
the order.244
Six months and one Supreme Court Justice replacement later, the Court
changed its tune. The Court’s decision in November 2020 invalidated
former New York Governor Cuomo’s executive order limiting occupancy
in religious establishments under the Free Exercise Clause and granted
injunctive relief to petitioners opposing its enforcement.245 In Roman
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,246 a presently unpublished opinion, the
Supreme Court held former New York Governor Cuomo’s executive order
unconstitutional in yet another 5–4 opinion, written by Justice Breyer.247
Executive Order 202–68, which limited the number of attendees allowed to
attend church services, was found in violation of the Free Exercise Clause
since the order imposed stricter regulations on religious establishments.248
A dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Roberts admonishes the Court for
such ruling when, after application to the Supreme Court, former
Governor Cuomo revised the order to comport with the Constitution.249

242. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
243. See id. (identifying the significant dangers of COVID-19 and deferring to the state’s power
under the Constitution).
244. See id. at 1613–14 (elaborating on the standards for issuance of an injunction, the scope of
the executive order, and the application of similar restrictions on secular activities).
245. See Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 68 (2020) (per curium)
(rejecting the constitutionality of New York Executive Order 202-68); see also Matt Mathers, Amy Coney
Barrett Plays Key Role in Overturning New York Covid Restrictions on Religious Gatherings, THE INDEP.
(Nov. 26, 2020), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/supreme-court-religiousgroups-new-york-covid-restrictions-b1762315.html [https://perma.cc/WW4V-EHJU] (commenting
on the Court’s inconsistency compared to earlier decisions regarding COVID-19).
246. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (per curium).
247. Id. at 65.
248. Id. at 67–68.
249. Id. at 75 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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Texas COVID-era constitutional law has taken a stance similar to that of
the November 2020 Court. The Texas Supreme Court ventured into a
discussion regarding separation of powers when a state of disaster is
declared, as it was during the COVID-19 pandemic.250 On March 29, 2020,
Governor Abbott issued Executive Order GA-13, which limited the ability
of trial courts to release accused persons with violent tendencies in response
to public fear that jails would release inmates to reduce the risk of COVID19 outbreaks within correctional facilities.251 In clarifying the relationship
between emergency, necessity, and the Constitution, the Court notes that
emergency does not allow constitutional circumvention.252 Judges filing
suit as individuals acting in their professional capacity, rather than a party
directly and adversely affected by the order, lack standing to challenge it.253
Although the court does not ultimately adjudicate the issue of GA-13’s
constitutionality, it seems to indicate that were a plaintiff to obtain standing,
the court would adhere to tenants of constitutional separation of powers
because, even in a state of disaster, “[t]he Constitution is not suspended.”254
Notably, the Texas Supreme Court is engaging in obiter dicta. While the
Texas Supreme Court justices’ comments do not have the force of law, they
assume facts and circumstances not present in the subject case merely to
express judicial opinion.
Seven months later, the Texas Supreme Court again delved into the
conflicts between COVID-related legislation and the Constitution.255
Although ultimately dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, Justice Devine’s
concurring opinion, again engaged in dicta and elaborated on the state of
emergency orders enacted pursuant to the pandemic:
The Texas Constitution is not a document of convenient consultation. It is a
steadfast, uninterrupted charter of governmental structure. Once this

250. See In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d 802, 805–06 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curium)
(discussing Governor Abbott’s ability to issue Executive Order GA-13, which suspended the ability of
trial courts to make discretionary releases of inmates in accordance with the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure).
251. Id. at 805–06.
252. Id. at 805 (writing, in the first sentences of the opinion: “The Constitution is not suspended
when the government declares a state of disaster. Nor do constitutional limitations on the jurisdiction
of courts cease to exist.”).
253. Id. at 805.
254. See id. (focusing on whether the court has the authority and the plaintiffs have standing,
rather than whether the order is constitutional under separation of powers principles).
255. In re Hotze, No. 20-0430, 2020 WL 4046034, at *1 (Tex. July 17, 2020).
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structure erodes, so does the promise of liberty. In these most atypical times,
Texans’ constitutional rights have taken a back seat to a series of executive
orders attempting to unilaterally quell the spread of the novel coronavirus.
But at what cost? . . . We should not, as we’ve recently said, “abandon the
Constitution at the moment we need it most.”256

Though the court ultimately decided it lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ
of mandamus against a state official, Justice Devine appears to agree that
the Texas Constitution, and at least some executive orders enacted under
Texas Government Code 418, are mutually exclusive.257
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts’ use of emergency powers has largely emulated emergencies
themselves: unpredictable, arbitrary, and perturbing. The law is deeply
troubled by emergency powers, and courts will generally take great care in
their exercise. Texas and federal disposition to questions of national or local
emergency can be viewed as largely circumstantial; justices and judges
consider the intended benefits of the legislation, the unintended
consequences, and some would argue, the public support for the order or
statute.258
As far as the future for courts and emergency powers, any claimed
prediction is clouded with serious doubt. Emergencies are inherently
unpredictable, as is our response in handling them. Our role as scholars is
not always to act as clairvoyants, but as mediators in understanding our past
and present. In writing about the politics of the First World War, Edward
Turner wrote: “Man who knows little of the present knows not the future,
and must watch in dumb expectation the loom of the universe rush on.”259
The future is uncertain, while our past and present provide necessary
context for its embrace.
If one thing is certain, emergency powers are not a fable, nor are they an
antiquated notion of early constitutional law; they are a paradox. The

256. Id. (quoting In re Salon a La Mode, No. 20-0340, 2020 WL 2125844, at *1 (Tex. May 5,
2020) (orig. proceeding) (Blacklock, J., concurring).
257. See In re Hotze, 2020 WL 4046034, at *3 (explaining why many executive orders will
“continually escape [their] review”).
258. See Mark Barnes, AIDS and Mr. Korematsu: Minorities at Times of Crisis, 7 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 35, 37 (1988) (“The detention orders and the public support they received were largely the
results of wartime panic and of a racism that equated Japanese ancestry with espionage.”).
259. Turner, supra note 106, at 35.
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pendulum of the courts swings from their explicit use to outright denial of
their existence.260 Scholars, judges, legislators, and citizens diverge as to
their endorsement or condemnation, and each of them uses sound
reasoning in reaching their conclusions.
The use of emergency powers is not always shameful and does not always
compromise fundamental principles on which the United States was
founded. Nor is it reasonable for the courts to singlehandedly determine
whether an emergency exists and condone extra-constitutional legislation.
Judges Learned Hand and Robert Jackson likewise expressed fear of courts
becoming the gatekeepers of democracy.261
Just as John Locke and Thomas Hobbes prophesized, in consenting to
government, we sacrifice some rights in the name of the greater good.262
As such, when the greater good is more difficult to achieve, it requires more
This give-and-take imagined by
sacrifice from its subjects.263
enlightenment philosophers is a fluid scale, not an on-off switch.
So long as Americans consider emergency powers in all-or-nothing,
black-and-white terms, the courts will remain in power purgatory.
Emergency powers have undeniably helped us in the past and predictably
will be used for the public good in the future. Similarly, the courts have
allowed encroachment on civil liberties in the name of the greater good,
although they later reversed course.264 Judicial denial of the existence of
emergency powers and their simultaneous utilization of them is perplexing
and dangerous. An alternate standard is necessary, and it should be based
on reason, balance, and reached without resort to absolutes.

260. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (“an emergency may
not call into life a power which has never lived.”(quoting Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 348 (1917));
see also Jones v. McMahan, 30 Tex. 719, 735 (1868) (“The ‘supreme law’ is the [C]onstitution of the
United States and this state . . . .”); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934) (“[N]either property
rights nor contract rights are absolute . . . .”).
261. McCormack, supra note 9, at 72 (first citing LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY:
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 189–90 (Irving Dillard ed., 3d ed. 1960); then citing
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he judiciary is not the final
bulwark against government repression.”)).
262. HOBBES, supra note 28, at 168 (“For in the act of our submission consisteth both our
obligation and our liberty . . . .”).
263. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (“There are manifold restraints to which
every person is necessarily subject for the common good.”).
264. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 214 (1944) (representing an account
when the Court condoned encroachment on the People’s rights), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
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